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Congress is hearing General Petraeus testify today on the surge. Pundits of both sides have of course already decided what he's going to say and reacted accordingly. I intend to hear the man out (via the news media) but, having just finished reading Rory Stewart's memoir of the Iraqi occupation, The Prince of the Marshes
, I'm not terribly hopeful. The Prince of the Marshes is a memoir, and like all such books, has the not-so-hidden agenda of not making the author look like a fool. Even reading with that filter, one finds Iraq to be a depressing place.
The title refers to a tribal sheik who was very influential in Maysan, an Iraqi province in the south. Rory was assigned as deputy governor there under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). For a time, the governor post was vacant, so he was de-facto ruler of that province. Stewart also spent some time in Dhi Qar, at the provincial capital of Nasiriyah, during the first Shia uprising.
Although the CPA had no shortage of self-imposed problems, from lack of staff to an extremely aggressive reconstruction timetable, the real problem painted by Stewart is an Iraqi society that was fragmented, distrustful, and unwilling to cooperate with each other. Kidnappings and shootings of people by rival parties, tribes or groups was common. Stewart held a number of meetings and got pledges by all the influential attendees as to a course of action, but then watched as those same people didn't match action with words.
Stewart accomplished much in terms of reconstruction, but political success eluded him. The Prince of the Marshes is a powerful but depressing story of that effort, yet well worth the read, especially now as we evaluate the way forward in Iraq.
Colin Powell allegedly warned President Bush about the "Pottery Barn Rule" in Iraq: you broke it, you own it. Reading Stewart's book, I suspect that Iraq was broke before we got there. Back in 2003, I could come up with no reason for Saddam to play reindeer games with the UN inspectors except that he had something to hide. I now suspect that Saddam used the threat of chemical weapons to keep the Army loyal, and used the Army to beat up on the people.
So, what's the Pottery Barn rule if it's broke before you got it? I don't know. I do know that if the Iraqi politicians don't want to get along, which appears to be the case, then we would have to stay in Iraq at these levels forever. We'd also have to rip up the existing government and start again, with a colonial-type administration.
Since there's not much stomach for that option, what can we do? Well, the Army can't sustain this surge past next summer. If that's the case, then we have a clear deadline for the Iraqis. Whether they will get the job done by then or not is, in the final analysis, not our problem. We "did our part" in Iraq - Saddam is gone.
The potential bad results from us leaving Iraq in a mess are our problem, but saying that a chaotic Iraq is bad doesn't tell us how to fix it. And no, I'm not fond of having to fight twice for the same piece of ground, which might be an outcome of us leaving. On the other hand, if we have to go back in again, things might be different. One of the reasons we've had more success in Afghanistan is that the people were truly sick and tired of fighting. One could argue that the massive devastation visited on Japan and Germany in WWII had a similar effect.
I truly hope the surge works. I have little hope that it will.
, I'm not terribly hopeful. The Prince of the Marshes is a memoir, and like all such books, has the not-so-hidden agenda of not making the author look like a fool. Even reading with that filter, one finds Iraq to be a depressing place. The title refers to a tribal sheik who was very influential in Maysan, an Iraqi province in the south. Rory was assigned as deputy governor there under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). For a time, the governor post was vacant, so he was de-facto ruler of that province. Stewart also spent some time in Dhi Qar, at the provincial capital of Nasiriyah, during the first Shia uprising.
Although the CPA had no shortage of self-imposed problems, from lack of staff to an extremely aggressive reconstruction timetable, the real problem painted by Stewart is an Iraqi society that was fragmented, distrustful, and unwilling to cooperate with each other. Kidnappings and shootings of people by rival parties, tribes or groups was common. Stewart held a number of meetings and got pledges by all the influential attendees as to a course of action, but then watched as those same people didn't match action with words.
Stewart accomplished much in terms of reconstruction, but political success eluded him. The Prince of the Marshes is a powerful but depressing story of that effort, yet well worth the read, especially now as we evaluate the way forward in Iraq.
Colin Powell allegedly warned President Bush about the "Pottery Barn Rule" in Iraq: you broke it, you own it. Reading Stewart's book, I suspect that Iraq was broke before we got there. Back in 2003, I could come up with no reason for Saddam to play reindeer games with the UN inspectors except that he had something to hide. I now suspect that Saddam used the threat of chemical weapons to keep the Army loyal, and used the Army to beat up on the people.
So, what's the Pottery Barn rule if it's broke before you got it? I don't know. I do know that if the Iraqi politicians don't want to get along, which appears to be the case, then we would have to stay in Iraq at these levels forever. We'd also have to rip up the existing government and start again, with a colonial-type administration.
Since there's not much stomach for that option, what can we do? Well, the Army can't sustain this surge past next summer. If that's the case, then we have a clear deadline for the Iraqis. Whether they will get the job done by then or not is, in the final analysis, not our problem. We "did our part" in Iraq - Saddam is gone.
The potential bad results from us leaving Iraq in a mess are our problem, but saying that a chaotic Iraq is bad doesn't tell us how to fix it. And no, I'm not fond of having to fight twice for the same piece of ground, which might be an outcome of us leaving. On the other hand, if we have to go back in again, things might be different. One of the reasons we've had more success in Afghanistan is that the people were truly sick and tired of fighting. One could argue that the massive devastation visited on Japan and Germany in WWII had a similar effect.
I truly hope the surge works. I have little hope that it will.