Piracy and Terror
Mar. 9th, 2010 09:04 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
chris_gerribI’ve written before of the link between piracy and terrorism. Some of those links are obvious – pirates flew a black flag to strike terror in their victims. Others are not so obvious. But the more I think of this link between piracy and terror, the more I think that the two are historically analogous situations, and that the “law enforcement approach” which ended piracy in the Caribbean is the correct approach for today’s terrorist threat.
I put “law enforcement approach” in quotes because the idea that the military is not involved in law enforcement is one of those “only in America” ideas. In the rest of the world, and for that matter in the USA prior to 1876, militaries were and are routinely involved in law enforcement. As part of the Compromise of 1877, the Posse Comitatus Act was passed, creating a firewall between the military and law enforcement. Even under current law, it only applies within the United States.
At any rate, what put an end to the piracy problem in the Caribbean was a simple concept – the military (usually Navy) captured pirates and cleared out pirate bases, and those pirates that survived the capture process were tried in civilian courts. Also important was that government support for piracy ended, about which more in a minute.
Although we tend to snicker at “Pirates of the Caribbean” and think of Johnny Depp, in the 17th Century pirates were a serious threat. The pirate Henry Morgan sacked Panama City and Maracaibo, two towns with fortifications and battalion-sized garrisons of regular troops. But this was only possible because Morgan, who ended his days as Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica, had the more-than-tacit support of Great Britain. (A Great Britain that did not yet rule the waves – in 1667 the Dutch fleet sailed up the Thames and shelled London, then left, brooms flying from their rigging.)
But despite Morgan’s power, the idea of attacking a mainland Spanish city didn’t even cross his mind. Nor could Morgan hold the colony towns he sacked. Once government support ended, piracy declined steeply. This was followed up by a vigorous use of military and police force, and, eventually, piracy came to a near-end. Piracy was a serious threat, but never an existential one.
The analogy to Al-Qaida should be obvious. Although the nuclear nightmare is a possibility, nobody seriously thinks Al-Qaida will develop its own nuclear weapons. They can hurt us, as we saw on 9/11, but overthrow the country? Not likely. Even less likely without their bases in Afghanistan – a place that makes Tortuga island look like a hub of industry.
So, in regards to Al Qaida, at least, we are roughly in the same place as the anti-piracy forces in the Caribbean were circa 1720 - plenty of pirates, but dispersed and relatively weak. Rounding them up required a lot of effort, including civilian police work. History doesn't repeat itself, but it rhymes.
I put “law enforcement approach” in quotes because the idea that the military is not involved in law enforcement is one of those “only in America” ideas. In the rest of the world, and for that matter in the USA prior to 1876, militaries were and are routinely involved in law enforcement. As part of the Compromise of 1877, the Posse Comitatus Act was passed, creating a firewall between the military and law enforcement. Even under current law, it only applies within the United States.
At any rate, what put an end to the piracy problem in the Caribbean was a simple concept – the military (usually Navy) captured pirates and cleared out pirate bases, and those pirates that survived the capture process were tried in civilian courts. Also important was that government support for piracy ended, about which more in a minute.
Although we tend to snicker at “Pirates of the Caribbean” and think of Johnny Depp, in the 17th Century pirates were a serious threat. The pirate Henry Morgan sacked Panama City and Maracaibo, two towns with fortifications and battalion-sized garrisons of regular troops. But this was only possible because Morgan, who ended his days as Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica, had the more-than-tacit support of Great Britain. (A Great Britain that did not yet rule the waves – in 1667 the Dutch fleet sailed up the Thames and shelled London, then left, brooms flying from their rigging.)
But despite Morgan’s power, the idea of attacking a mainland Spanish city didn’t even cross his mind. Nor could Morgan hold the colony towns he sacked. Once government support ended, piracy declined steeply. This was followed up by a vigorous use of military and police force, and, eventually, piracy came to a near-end. Piracy was a serious threat, but never an existential one.
The analogy to Al-Qaida should be obvious. Although the nuclear nightmare is a possibility, nobody seriously thinks Al-Qaida will develop its own nuclear weapons. They can hurt us, as we saw on 9/11, but overthrow the country? Not likely. Even less likely without their bases in Afghanistan – a place that makes Tortuga island look like a hub of industry.
So, in regards to Al Qaida, at least, we are roughly in the same place as the anti-piracy forces in the Caribbean were circa 1720 - plenty of pirates, but dispersed and relatively weak. Rounding them up required a lot of effort, including civilian police work. History doesn't repeat itself, but it rhymes.
