Moment of Truth in Iraq
Jun. 3rd, 2008 11:20 amThis weekend, I finished reading Michael Yon’s new book, Moment of Truth in Iraq
. The book illustrates a number of the problems with our understanding of the Iraq situation.
First off, I should be clear. Yon is by no means a cheerleader for the Bush Administration. Very early on in the book he is sharply critical of our post-war plans and operations, and still believes, even today, that we simply don’t have as many troops on the ground in Iraq as we should have. What he doesn’t say but I suspect he acknowledges is that, short of Federalizing the entire National Guard for the duration, we don’t have more troops to commit. Of course, if we’re really in a life-or-death struggle, then maybe we should call out the Guard.
But I digress. Yon felt and reported that, during 2004-2005, the situation in Iraq was going to hell in a hand basket. In Moment of Truth, he states his opinion, based on extensive time on the ground that the situation is stabilizing. Petreaus’ strategy, which is classic counterinsurgency, seems to be working, and if we don’t have as many troops as we should have, we have enough. He also reports that Iraqi troops are starting to get good, and produce useful results. He takes part in several operations with Iraqi troops and local militias (including the 1920 Brigades, a group that until recently was shooting at us) and finds them effective and motivated.
Yon is by no means a Pollyanna. He notes that, for example, the 1920 Brigades still want US troops gone, so in some part the current success is an alliance against a common enemy. Al Queda is massively unpopular, politically stupid, corrupt and brutal – all of which helps us. He also notes that the Iraqi central government is not terribly popular, due to its ethnic makeup.
Yon’s book highlights a number of issues I have with both the conduct of the war and the reporting of it.
* Our military is doing a lot of good things in Iraq, probably more then we should expect of them. But much of this good is not reported. It seems “soldiers as victims,” whether they are dead, wounded or mentally afflicted, are reported, but troops enjoying success are not.
* Reporting provided by the large media outlets is sorely lacking. First, their reporters don’t spend enough time in country (per Yon, half of a two-week stint in country can easily be burnt up getting credentials) and second, by having little or no understanding of military operations, the reporters don’t know what they are looking at.
* Civilian political reconstruction efforts are sorely lacking. The military are running the town meetings, fixing the sewers, etc. and the rest of the US government is nowhere to be found.
Unfortunately, saying that “we’re turning a corner in Iraq” immediately draws fire from opponents of the Bush Administration. Simply put, they and so many of their supporters have been saying that for so long that, like the boy who cried wolf, nobody believes it. This could truly be a “Moment of Truth, if Yon is right.
First off, I should be clear. Yon is by no means a cheerleader for the Bush Administration. Very early on in the book he is sharply critical of our post-war plans and operations, and still believes, even today, that we simply don’t have as many troops on the ground in Iraq as we should have. What he doesn’t say but I suspect he acknowledges is that, short of Federalizing the entire National Guard for the duration, we don’t have more troops to commit. Of course, if we’re really in a life-or-death struggle, then maybe we should call out the Guard.
But I digress. Yon felt and reported that, during 2004-2005, the situation in Iraq was going to hell in a hand basket. In Moment of Truth, he states his opinion, based on extensive time on the ground that the situation is stabilizing. Petreaus’ strategy, which is classic counterinsurgency, seems to be working, and if we don’t have as many troops as we should have, we have enough. He also reports that Iraqi troops are starting to get good, and produce useful results. He takes part in several operations with Iraqi troops and local militias (including the 1920 Brigades, a group that until recently was shooting at us) and finds them effective and motivated.
Yon is by no means a Pollyanna. He notes that, for example, the 1920 Brigades still want US troops gone, so in some part the current success is an alliance against a common enemy. Al Queda is massively unpopular, politically stupid, corrupt and brutal – all of which helps us. He also notes that the Iraqi central government is not terribly popular, due to its ethnic makeup.
Yon’s book highlights a number of issues I have with both the conduct of the war and the reporting of it.
* Our military is doing a lot of good things in Iraq, probably more then we should expect of them. But much of this good is not reported. It seems “soldiers as victims,” whether they are dead, wounded or mentally afflicted, are reported, but troops enjoying success are not.
* Reporting provided by the large media outlets is sorely lacking. First, their reporters don’t spend enough time in country (per Yon, half of a two-week stint in country can easily be burnt up getting credentials) and second, by having little or no understanding of military operations, the reporters don’t know what they are looking at.
* Civilian political reconstruction efforts are sorely lacking. The military are running the town meetings, fixing the sewers, etc. and the rest of the US government is nowhere to be found.
Unfortunately, saying that “we’re turning a corner in Iraq” immediately draws fire from opponents of the Bush Administration. Simply put, they and so many of their supporters have been saying that for so long that, like the boy who cried wolf, nobody believes it. This could truly be a “Moment of Truth, if Yon is right.
no subject
Date: 2008-06-03 09:49 pm (UTC)We should have stood up a 'Department of Reconstruction' before OIF kicked off - it was clearly the right thing to do.
Who would run such a thing? Probably the State department - but they might have gotten caught by an organizational problem: staffing up a DOR is in the best long-term interests of the country, but doesn't serve the short-term interests of the 'crats.
Consider that your staffer spends a year or five in the DOR. DOR isn't forever and eventually it will wind up. They come back to their career track in State - and their peers are that much further ahead of them.
Also .. we can assume it draws staff from the entire Federal government. Getting staff from the military, no problem. Can you draft a GS and tell them 'you're going to DOR for two years, pack your bags'? I don't know but I'll bet the answer is 'no'.
no subject
Date: 2008-06-04 01:52 am (UTC)Your points are valid - it just irritates me that we seem to be half-assing this war.