How Wars Are Won - Iran

[chris_gerrib]

The first thing one needs to understand about Iran is that the official religion is Shi’ite Shi'a Islam. This means that Al Queda, in particular, and the majority Sunni Arabs in general consider Iran a heretic state. Understanding this fact explains why Iran did not oppose our operations in Afghanistan and is not a base for the Taliban.

Second, Mahmoud Ahmandinejad, the president of Iran, may in fact be able to call his underwear his own*, but he is NOT the commander-in-chief of the Iranian military. Constitutionally, he’s more like a chief of staff for the Supreme Leader, a cleric, then a head of government. The real power resides with the Mullahs in Qum. I’ve heard some commentators call them the “mad Mullahs” but personally I think they’re more like “crazy as a fox.”

Let’s consider one act of the mullahs – developing nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles. Now, their president (seen on state TV holding presumably enriched uranium) says he will “destroy Israel.” He’s got a funny way of doing it.

If he was really serious about nuking Israel, he wouldn’t need missiles. It’s much easier and less traceable to smuggle bombs in then to fly them in via rockets. Also, why publicly develop a weapon? Do it quietly, and if you do it right, the first warning your adversary gets is when his cities evaporate.

Ballistic missiles only make sense if you’re looking for deterrence or blackmail. (Nice country you have there. Shame if something happens to it.) The missiles are a credible, visible and controllable threat. A suitcase bomb is none of the above.

Iran, via Syria, funds Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a genuine pain in the ass to Israel, but not a credible threat to their existence. Hezbollah and the bomb are ways to extort power and influence. Similarly, a few months back Iran kidnapped some British Royal Navy sailors, who were quickly released. Why – to make a point that Iran was not to be trifled with.



It appears that Iran’s leaders want greater influence, not suicide. They’re quite willing to overthrow a government, and the long-term religious goal is to rule the world. It strikes me that we just got done playing a similar game with a group of folks who had a quasi-religious ideal of “uniting the workers of the world.”

Much like that previous round, Western liberal democracy holds the better long-term hand. The Iranian economy is not that robust, nor are the current leaders terribly popular in their own country. We should bear in mind, of course, that the quickest way to get the Iranian people to rally ‘round the flag is to attack their homeland. In short, welcome to the new Cold War.


* with apologies to Issac Asimov. I've wanted to use that line for years. 

Comments

Points of Concurrence

[rodney-g-graves.livejournal.com]

In the following areas of your post I agree with you:

1. Official Religion. I'll quibble that the particular sect is referred to as Shi'a, and it's adherents Shi'ite, and further quibble that the adherents of Shi'a are a bare majority of the population


2. The Iranian Presidency. I'll agree that the Presidency is largely a figurehead position, and that the mullahs (who are indeed mad, and not like a fox, but more on that later) are the real power.

I'll make my counter case later and link to if from here.

Re: Points of Concurrence

[chris-gerrib.livejournal.com]

I'll make the Shi'a correction, and look forward to your post.

Of Threats and their Neturalization

[rodney-g-graves.livejournal.com]

Being my response posted here (http://rodney-g-graves.livejournal.com/3029.html).

Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence

[rodney-g-graves.livejournal.com]

Being a U. S. Strategic Command doctrinal document (http://nautilus.org/archives/nukestrat/USA/Advisory/essentials95.txt) recently declassified and being discussed at The Belmont Club (http://pajamasmedia.com/richardfernandez/2008/07/08/when-in-doubt-dont/) seems to pertain:

The key concept embodied in the Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence is the idea that it rests on an American commitment to inflict an unspecified but devastating response upon any nation or group that attacks it. In order to prevent any adversary from legalistically parsing a pre-announced set of conditions under which the United States would retaliate, all the terms were left intentionally vague so that only American national command authority could say with certainty what would happen next. In the words of the document:

While it is crucial to explicitly define and communicate the acts or damages that we would find unacceptable and, hence, what it is that we are specifically seeking to deter, we should not be very specific about our response. It is however, crucial that the level of our commitment to the things we value be unfaltering, and that the adversary have little doubt of this. Without saying exactly what the consequences will be if the US has to respond, whether the reaction would either be responsive or preemptive, we must communicate in the strongest ways possible the unreakable link between our vital interests and the potential harm that will be directly attributable to anyone who damages (or even credibly threatens to damage) that which we hold of value.

This has the effect of threatening a vastly disproportionate response towards any attempts at aggression by strategic inferiors. While a proportionate response is not ruled out, neither — and this is the essential point — is a wholly disproportionate one. Under such a doctrine a missile defense capability would play a very important role: it would greatly increase the potential lopsidedness of the exchange. Time and again the Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence emphasizes the idea that one of key goals of modern defense is to instill uncertainty in the minds of an adversary — whether that opponent is rational or not.

All the more reason to make Iran the "good" "bad example" of the "benefits" of waging war by proxy against the United States.