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Iran and Hamas, Part 2
Jun. 7th, 2010 10:33 amThursday's discussion of Israel and Hamas turned into a repetitive and name-calling slapfest, so I locked comments on that thread. (If this post goes the same route, I reserve the right to do the same. My place, my rules.)
At any rate, one of the arguments was that Hamas was an existential threat to Israel because Iran might give Hamas an atomic bomb. I am told that Iran, or the leaders thereof, are crazy and willing to martyr their country to destroy Israel. I am also told that Hamas shares that craziness. I suspect this is not the case - I note that Hamas in particular is only able to come up with a few handfuls of suicide bombers. But let's assume that Iran and Hamas are crazy.
The first problem the statement "Hamas is an existential threat to Israel" is admittedly semantics - Hamas is merely an instrument or conduit for Iran, not the main threat. Nor could Hamas be an effective cutout or "plausible deniability" shield.
See, back in the day, the US ran the Looking Glass airborne command post. Although not frequently discussed, the flag officer on Looking Glass could release nuclear weapons on his own accord, in the event of a decapitating strike on Washington, DC. Royal Navy SSBNs have their "Prime Minister's letters," which are posthumous instructions to the commander for nuclear weapons release. I'm not sure what exact method Israel uses, but if Tel Aviv goes up in smoke, I'm reasonably comfortable Tehran will go up shortly thereafter.
The second problem with the Hamas as conduit for a bomb is the actions of Hamas. Actions speak louder than words, and their actions, particularly the penny-ante and ineffective rocket attacks that provoked the blockade are exactly the opposite of what you'd expect if a nuke was expected. I mean, surely it would be easier to smuggle in a bomb if first you didn't have to break a blockade? In fact, one might suspect that Hamas wants a blockade, for domestic political consumption.
At any rate, Iran is clearly the major threat. And, however crazy they may be, they want to at least take Israel with them in a nuclear exchange. Otherwise, provoking a nuclear war is easy enough. Here again, actions speak louder then words. Why is Iran publicly developing a nuclear capacity and long-range rockets? The answer is deterrence. (Please don't get me wrong - a nuclear-armed Iran is a big problem for the international community, and one that we should try to avoid.)
Deterrence requires a publicly-known nuclear capability. Countries that are planning or contemplating an offensive use of weapons (the US, South Africa, Israel) develop the weapon in secret. This has the added tactical advantage of greatly lowering the risk of a pre-emptive strike to deprive one of the weapon before it is ready.
One can't use a nuclear weapon as a deterrent without a delivery mechanism. Planning to smuggle one in during a crisis is risky (slow, higher security) and having bombs pre-staged create great risks of premature discovery and/or detonation. Also, making a claim to have bombs pre-staged in a crisis may simply not be believed. Long-range rockets solve all those problems. They are visible, nearly unstoppable, and entirely safe and secure in (in this case) Iranian territory.
So what do we see Iran doing? They are very publicly testing long-range rockets, and have had their President on state-run TV waving around (presumably enriched) uranium like it was a kid's toy. While this is going on, Hamas is attempting to launch pinprick attacks on Israel that will only result in disproportionate retaliation.
Maybe Iran and Hamas are crazy. But are they stupid too?
I suspect not. I suspect that Iran sees Hamas and Hezbollah much as the USSR saw Cuba, or England saw Henry Morgan: a cheap way to irritate and harass an enemy without risking the full wrath of the enemy. I suspect that the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah see attacking Israel at least in part as a way to perpetuate their own political power. Again, this does not mean Hamas and Iran are not problems - they are. They are not existential problems.
At any rate, one of the arguments was that Hamas was an existential threat to Israel because Iran might give Hamas an atomic bomb. I am told that Iran, or the leaders thereof, are crazy and willing to martyr their country to destroy Israel. I am also told that Hamas shares that craziness. I suspect this is not the case - I note that Hamas in particular is only able to come up with a few handfuls of suicide bombers. But let's assume that Iran and Hamas are crazy.
The first problem the statement "Hamas is an existential threat to Israel" is admittedly semantics - Hamas is merely an instrument or conduit for Iran, not the main threat. Nor could Hamas be an effective cutout or "plausible deniability" shield.
See, back in the day, the US ran the Looking Glass airborne command post. Although not frequently discussed, the flag officer on Looking Glass could release nuclear weapons on his own accord, in the event of a decapitating strike on Washington, DC. Royal Navy SSBNs have their "Prime Minister's letters," which are posthumous instructions to the commander for nuclear weapons release. I'm not sure what exact method Israel uses, but if Tel Aviv goes up in smoke, I'm reasonably comfortable Tehran will go up shortly thereafter.
The second problem with the Hamas as conduit for a bomb is the actions of Hamas. Actions speak louder than words, and their actions, particularly the penny-ante and ineffective rocket attacks that provoked the blockade are exactly the opposite of what you'd expect if a nuke was expected. I mean, surely it would be easier to smuggle in a bomb if first you didn't have to break a blockade? In fact, one might suspect that Hamas wants a blockade, for domestic political consumption.
At any rate, Iran is clearly the major threat. And, however crazy they may be, they want to at least take Israel with them in a nuclear exchange. Otherwise, provoking a nuclear war is easy enough. Here again, actions speak louder then words. Why is Iran publicly developing a nuclear capacity and long-range rockets? The answer is deterrence. (Please don't get me wrong - a nuclear-armed Iran is a big problem for the international community, and one that we should try to avoid.)
Deterrence requires a publicly-known nuclear capability. Countries that are planning or contemplating an offensive use of weapons (the US, South Africa, Israel) develop the weapon in secret. This has the added tactical advantage of greatly lowering the risk of a pre-emptive strike to deprive one of the weapon before it is ready.
One can't use a nuclear weapon as a deterrent without a delivery mechanism. Planning to smuggle one in during a crisis is risky (slow, higher security) and having bombs pre-staged create great risks of premature discovery and/or detonation. Also, making a claim to have bombs pre-staged in a crisis may simply not be believed. Long-range rockets solve all those problems. They are visible, nearly unstoppable, and entirely safe and secure in (in this case) Iranian territory.
So what do we see Iran doing? They are very publicly testing long-range rockets, and have had their President on state-run TV waving around (presumably enriched) uranium like it was a kid's toy. While this is going on, Hamas is attempting to launch pinprick attacks on Israel that will only result in disproportionate retaliation.
Maybe Iran and Hamas are crazy. But are they stupid too?
I suspect not. I suspect that Iran sees Hamas and Hezbollah much as the USSR saw Cuba, or England saw Henry Morgan: a cheap way to irritate and harass an enemy without risking the full wrath of the enemy. I suspect that the leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah see attacking Israel at least in part as a way to perpetuate their own political power. Again, this does not mean Hamas and Iran are not problems - they are. They are not existential problems.
