Two Wrongs Don't Make A Right
Sep. 24th, 2010 11:33 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
chris_gerribI think Thomas Jefferson was a great man. President, writer of the Declaration of Independence, Revolutionary War leader - who wouldn't agree with me? Thomas Jefferson also owned slaves, and, unlike George Washington, who freed all the slaves he legally could, Jefferson kept his slaves.
I think Winston Churchill was a great man, especially for his heroic leadership in winning World War II. But Churchill's ineptness at naval tactics proved very costly during the First World War. After the war, his colonial decisions, especially the use of poison gas to suppress Iraqi revolts during the 1920s, continue to cause problems for the modern world.
My first point is this - nobody is perfect. We are all human and flawed by definition. Everybody does something wrong or could have done something better.
My second point is that identifying the flaws of historical figures or eras does not mean that we have to throw away that era. Saying, for example, that the British colonization of Kenya wrong doesn't mean that Britain (or America) has no moral standing to criticize evils done by Kenyans or in Kenya, either then or now. Or more simply, two wrongs don't make a right.
Now, understanding the history of say, Kenyan colonization may explain why certain bad things have or are happening. Understanding why is not the same as approving of the action. Poor people are more likely to steal stuff than are rich people. This doesn't make theft right - it explains and predicts the action. Criminal profilers study why criminals commit crime, not to justify it, but to catch the offenders.
Sometimes things are simple. Sometimes the "bad guy" really is just evil. But sometimes things aren't simple. The trick is understanding which is which.
I think Winston Churchill was a great man, especially for his heroic leadership in winning World War II. But Churchill's ineptness at naval tactics proved very costly during the First World War. After the war, his colonial decisions, especially the use of poison gas to suppress Iraqi revolts during the 1920s, continue to cause problems for the modern world.
My first point is this - nobody is perfect. We are all human and flawed by definition. Everybody does something wrong or could have done something better.
My second point is that identifying the flaws of historical figures or eras does not mean that we have to throw away that era. Saying, for example, that the British colonization of Kenya wrong doesn't mean that Britain (or America) has no moral standing to criticize evils done by Kenyans or in Kenya, either then or now. Or more simply, two wrongs don't make a right.
Now, understanding the history of say, Kenyan colonization may explain why certain bad things have or are happening. Understanding why is not the same as approving of the action. Poor people are more likely to steal stuff than are rich people. This doesn't make theft right - it explains and predicts the action. Criminal profilers study why criminals commit crime, not to justify it, but to catch the offenders.
Sometimes things are simple. Sometimes the "bad guy" really is just evil. But sometimes things aren't simple. The trick is understanding which is which.
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The Dardanelles
Date: 2010-09-24 06:03 pm (UTC)If you're talking about the Dardanelles, I disagree that this was an example of Churchillian ineptness. The Dardanelles attack was a gamble -- and originally a gamble at decent odds -- which very nearly worked. Had it worked, Turkey would have been knocked out of the war, Russia resupplied, and the whole course of the war been very different (among other things, the war would have been shortened by about a year, and the Bolshevik Revolution would probably have been entirely avoided).
The naval attack was called off -- on the judgement of the naval commander on the scene -- because of the loss of warships to mines. The thing is that, had the attack been pressed a bit longer, the chances are that it would have worked (and the opposed Gallipoli landings avoided). Had it worked, the additional loss of men and material represented by another old battleship or two lost would have been utterly dwarfed by the loss of men and material avoided by the victory.
The trait that Churchill demonstrated in ordering the Dardanelles attack was not ineptness, but risk-taking. Which can lead to good, or bad outcomes. Unfortunately for the whole world, in this case it led to a bad outcome.
Re: The Dardanelles
Date: 2010-09-24 06:18 pm (UTC)Goeben and Breslau
Date: 2010-09-24 06:49 pm (UTC)In Souchon's path were the two British battlecruisers, Indomitable and Indefatigable, which made contact at 9.30 a.m. on 4 August, passing the German ships in the opposite direction. Unlike France, Britain was not yet at war with Germany (the declaration would not be made until later that day, following the start of the German invasion of neutral Belgium), and so the British ships commenced shadowing Goeben and Breslau. Milne reported the contact and position, but neglected to inform the Admiralty that the German ships were heading east. Churchill therefore still expected them to threaten the French transports, and he authorized Milne to engage the German ships if they attacked. However, a meeting of the British Cabinet decided that hostilities could not start before a declaration of war, and at 2.00 p.m. Churchill was obliged to cancel his authorisation to attack ...
the British Cabinet overruled Churchill's order to attack. I'm not sure of just what mistake you're accusing Churchill, then ... had he not canceled the attack, he would have been defying the orders of his superiors (and, incidentally, have muddied the question of war guilt between Britain and Germany, as he would have been jumping the gun on the declaration of war).
If you're arguing that he was wrong to order the Royal Navy to shadow the German warships in the first place, it would have been clearly irresponsible for him to let them roam the Mediterranean unchecked at such a moment, with war imminent. Had he done that, and had they then attacked the French troop convoys, it would have impaired Anglo-French relations at the very moment of crisis -- and had the Germans successfully cut the transport lines between North Africa and France, it might have had worse consequences, as every division was to count in the upcoming battles in Northeastern France. Failure to protect the troop convoys could have lost the war right at the start!
Re: Goeben and Breslau
Date: 2010-09-24 07:05 pm (UTC)The first naval failure was Churchill's initial order to Milne. The French had three squadrons covering their troop ships - why would Milne need to help the French? Milne's orders should have been "find the Germans and stick to them like glue."
There were other screwups - the fixation on the Austrians coming out, for example. But probably the biggest failure was Churchill's personal involvement. Why the hell was the First Lord of the Admiralty giving tactical orders to Rear Admirals? Especially a First Lord with no Naval experience? Put a C-in-C Mediterranean, give them some goals, and get out of the way.
Re: Goeben and Breslau
Date: 2010-09-24 07:39 pm (UTC)Good point, and this goes to Churchill's very British tendency to despise the power of the French at sea. OTOH, had Churchill not given such an order, and had the Germans then successfully overwhelmed the troop convoy escorts (quite possible in light of the later German naval performance in the war), you would be condemning Churchill for not ordering the escort reinforced.
... the fixation on the Austrians coming out, for example.
The Austro-Hungarian fleet at Trieste was hardly inconsiderable, and the Austro-Hungarians were the first of the Central Powers to actually go to war.
But probably the biggest failure was Churchill's personal involvement. Why the hell was the First Lord of the Admiralty giving tactical orders to Rear Admirals? Especially a First Lord with no Naval experience? Put a C-in-C Mediterranean, give them some goals, and get out of the way.
Quite a good point, and Churchill's tendency to micro-manage would give his subordinates headaches, and contribute to more than one defeat, later on in both World Wars.
Re: Goeben and Breslau
Date: 2010-09-24 08:10 pm (UTC)A concentrated force around Malta, for example, with a couple of scout ships, would have been a better option. A squadron there could support the French or intercept the Germans or cut off the Austrians from their base, thus limiting their damage.
Instead the Royal Navy was spread out in penny packets. I mean, it's not like Troubridge's 4 armored cruisers were going to stop the Austrian fleet.
Re: Goeben and Breslau
Date: 2010-09-24 08:21 pm (UTC)That's a fairly British thing too, certainly dating back to the 19th century, when it was well known enough to have WS Gilbert make fun of it in HMS Pinafore.
Churchill was a charismatic and influential war leader, and was recently voted the greatest ever Englishman, but it's fair to say he had blind spots in his vision large enough to hide entire continents... for example, India.
Re: Goeben and Breslau
Date: 2010-09-24 08:22 pm (UTC)It was good enough for Nelson :)
Re: Goeben and Breslau
Date: 2010-09-24 09:10 pm (UTC)Re: Goeben and Breslau
Date: 2010-09-24 09:13 pm (UTC)