Pearl Harbor
Dec. 12th, 2011 10:21 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
chris_gerribOne of the great debates in naval history is how the Japanese were able to pull off the attack at Pearl Harbor. Surprise attacks from the air had been launched before, but part of what shocked the American military was the scale of the assault. Not only was the fleet in the harbor attacked, but every major airfield on Oahu, and all these assaults were coordinated and carried out in force.
Well, this article argues that The picture that emerges [of Japanese carrier aviation] is of an enemy carrier force whose capabilities in late 1941 were mutating almost overnight.. For example:
A) The six Japanese aircraft carriers were first grouped together in one unit in April, 1941!
B) Two of the Japanese carriers did not have the range to get to Pearl and back, and, as late as October, 1941 the Japanese could not conduct refueling at sea. One of the earlier plans for the Pearl attack involved scuttling the two carriers that couldn't make it back after the attack.
C) The idea of unified command of the air wing in the air had to be forced on the Japanese carrier COs in October. This was something that the USN wouldn't do for another two years. In fact, at Midway, the carrier air wings were supposed to fight as individual units, not as a combined whole.
In order to understand the intentions of the enemy (any enemy) one must understand what they are capable of doing, and what they think they are capable of doing. Japanese capabilities were changing so rapidly that I suspect many Japanese officers were surprised at what the carriers were capable of.
Well, this article argues that The picture that emerges [of Japanese carrier aviation] is of an enemy carrier force whose capabilities in late 1941 were mutating almost overnight.. For example:
A) The six Japanese aircraft carriers were first grouped together in one unit in April, 1941!
B) Two of the Japanese carriers did not have the range to get to Pearl and back, and, as late as October, 1941 the Japanese could not conduct refueling at sea. One of the earlier plans for the Pearl attack involved scuttling the two carriers that couldn't make it back after the attack.
C) The idea of unified command of the air wing in the air had to be forced on the Japanese carrier COs in October. This was something that the USN wouldn't do for another two years. In fact, at Midway, the carrier air wings were supposed to fight as individual units, not as a combined whole.
In order to understand the intentions of the enemy (any enemy) one must understand what they are capable of doing, and what they think they are capable of doing. Japanese capabilities were changing so rapidly that I suspect many Japanese officers were surprised at what the carriers were capable of.
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Date: 2011-12-13 03:13 am (UTC)