4th Generation War Ain't So New
Feb. 9th, 2015 09:28 am![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
chris_gerribI mentioned that I would have more cogent thoughts on "4th Generation Warfare." Here they are.
William Lind, inventor of the concept, argues that 4th Generation warfare is unique because you have violent non-state actors making war. These warlike acts include psychological warfare, propaganda, terrorism and direct attacks on civilians. He does not see a way for the US to fight and win these wars.
To me, these wars look shockingly like the colonial wars of the 1800s, such as what we fought in the trans-Mississippi west against the American Indians. They also look a lot like the wars England fought in India, Afghanistan and Africa during the same period. In these wars, a small, professional army with limited tolerance for casualties fought larger, diffuse, poorly-equipped groups.
The US and UK won some of these wars and lost a few (Afghanistan). It seems to me that the key to winning was persistence - fielding troops for decades and grinding down the enemy. In cases where there was insufficient strategic reason to grind down (Afghanistan for the UK) the war ended with the withdrawal of the colonial forces.
This was in part because the colonial force had the option to withdraw. In the American West or India, withdrawal was not seen (at the time) as an option, so the troops, the government and the public collectively gritted their teeth and did what they had to do. As somebody a lot smarter than I said, "war is politics by other means." What is politically acceptable governs what wars we fight.
William Lind, inventor of the concept, argues that 4th Generation warfare is unique because you have violent non-state actors making war. These warlike acts include psychological warfare, propaganda, terrorism and direct attacks on civilians. He does not see a way for the US to fight and win these wars.
To me, these wars look shockingly like the colonial wars of the 1800s, such as what we fought in the trans-Mississippi west against the American Indians. They also look a lot like the wars England fought in India, Afghanistan and Africa during the same period. In these wars, a small, professional army with limited tolerance for casualties fought larger, diffuse, poorly-equipped groups.
The US and UK won some of these wars and lost a few (Afghanistan). It seems to me that the key to winning was persistence - fielding troops for decades and grinding down the enemy. In cases where there was insufficient strategic reason to grind down (Afghanistan for the UK) the war ended with the withdrawal of the colonial forces.
This was in part because the colonial force had the option to withdraw. In the American West or India, withdrawal was not seen (at the time) as an option, so the troops, the government and the public collectively gritted their teeth and did what they had to do. As somebody a lot smarter than I said, "war is politics by other means." What is politically acceptable governs what wars we fight.
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Date: 2015-02-10 02:54 am (UTC)Naturally, as even Hermann Goering recognized, the trick then is to persuade the populace that they are in that situation, whether or not (particularly when not) the situation is that dire. Thus the trailer-park jingoism about how invading Iraq and Afghanistan was “fighting for our freedom” or even weirder, “fighting for our country.” Only if that's what they were doing, could what they were doing be accepted without complaint!