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The Strategic Bombing Error
Apr. 2nd, 2008 09:03 amSo I mentioned that I had thoughts about the ending of Fire in a Faraway Place. It’s not much of a spoiler to tell you that the ending involves flying a spaceship into a building in Tokyo, the world capital. The protagonists do this because they are fighting a corporation, and decide that the only way to win is to “pierce the corporate veil” and make the people behind the corporation bleed. The critic of Scalzi’s who started this ball rolling apparently felt that this plot similarity was what ended Frezza’s career, although the man’s writing career appeared to be over well before 9/11.
More importantly, Frezza (via his characters) got it wrong. The suicide attack in Faraway Place was intended to prevent further attacks on the protagonist’s adopted homeworld. In the book, they succeeded in that goal. The 9/11 attacks were intended to do the opposite, namely provoke an attack. I suspect that in the real world, the attack Frezza described would have also resulted in a massive counterattack.
Nations go to war and people resort to violence for a variety of reasons. For purposes of this discussion, they can be ranked in a continuum with one end being “pure profit” and the other end being “pure ideology.” Armed robbers use guns to make money and serial killers commit murder for (sick and twisted) ideological reasons. The colonial wars of the 18th and 19th centuries were largely for profit via controlling territory, while Hitler and Tojo made war because they thought their people should rule the world. These are simplified examples, but I think they’ll do.
Frezza’s war starts out as a simple colonial or for-profit war. So, logically, by increasing the price of the war, the powers that be would decide to take a pass on further conflict. Except in this case, by attacking at the heart of the home world, the stakes have been raised too high, and now the war has become a matter of survival. The fact of people fighting and dying “over there” is one thing, but the risk of me dying here is entirely different and more important.
Going back to the armed robbery example, if, during an armed robbery, the victim produces a gun, they will probably have to use it. The armed robber may assume that he’s now in a fight for his life, and may try to shoot his way out. This isn’t to say what one should or shouldn’t do if this happens, merely a statement of what may happen, and that half-measures probably won’t work.
In the realm of nations, Fire in a Faraway Place falls victim to the strategic bombing mindset. During both WWII and Vietnam, proponents of strategic bombing argued that they could persuade the other side to change policies by making it too costly to continue. This did not work. Even the atomic bomb wouldn’t have worked if it wasn’t clear that Japan had already lost the war via conventional means. (The Japanese war plan at that point was to bloody the Americans and sue for something better then unconditional surrender.)
Bin Laden apparently understood this. He knew that his previous attacks were not seen as threats to the existence of the US, and so the response would be moderate. But Bin Laden wanted something that would mobilize the masses of Islam. A moderate, targeted response aimed just at him wouldn’t do that. Our response in Afghanistan was probably more moderate then what Bin Laden wanted or expected, and the “Arab street’s” counter-response is still less then Bin Laden wants. But give the man credit – he understands how nations work better then buildings full of Air Force generals.
More importantly, Frezza (via his characters) got it wrong. The suicide attack in Faraway Place was intended to prevent further attacks on the protagonist’s adopted homeworld. In the book, they succeeded in that goal. The 9/11 attacks were intended to do the opposite, namely provoke an attack. I suspect that in the real world, the attack Frezza described would have also resulted in a massive counterattack.
Nations go to war and people resort to violence for a variety of reasons. For purposes of this discussion, they can be ranked in a continuum with one end being “pure profit” and the other end being “pure ideology.” Armed robbers use guns to make money and serial killers commit murder for (sick and twisted) ideological reasons. The colonial wars of the 18th and 19th centuries were largely for profit via controlling territory, while Hitler and Tojo made war because they thought their people should rule the world. These are simplified examples, but I think they’ll do.
Frezza’s war starts out as a simple colonial or for-profit war. So, logically, by increasing the price of the war, the powers that be would decide to take a pass on further conflict. Except in this case, by attacking at the heart of the home world, the stakes have been raised too high, and now the war has become a matter of survival. The fact of people fighting and dying “over there” is one thing, but the risk of me dying here is entirely different and more important.
Going back to the armed robbery example, if, during an armed robbery, the victim produces a gun, they will probably have to use it. The armed robber may assume that he’s now in a fight for his life, and may try to shoot his way out. This isn’t to say what one should or shouldn’t do if this happens, merely a statement of what may happen, and that half-measures probably won’t work.
In the realm of nations, Fire in a Faraway Place falls victim to the strategic bombing mindset. During both WWII and Vietnam, proponents of strategic bombing argued that they could persuade the other side to change policies by making it too costly to continue. This did not work. Even the atomic bomb wouldn’t have worked if it wasn’t clear that Japan had already lost the war via conventional means. (The Japanese war plan at that point was to bloody the Americans and sue for something better then unconditional surrender.)
Bin Laden apparently understood this. He knew that his previous attacks were not seen as threats to the existence of the US, and so the response would be moderate. But Bin Laden wanted something that would mobilize the masses of Islam. A moderate, targeted response aimed just at him wouldn’t do that. Our response in Afghanistan was probably more moderate then what Bin Laden wanted or expected, and the “Arab street’s” counter-response is still less then Bin Laden wants. But give the man credit – he understands how nations work better then buildings full of Air Force generals.
